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SUMMARYMany more people would like to migrate to the EU than the
EU is ready to absorb. But who should be allowed to enter and who
should not?  The economic effects of high-skilled immigration are
generally positive for the receiving country while low-skilled migration
has more ambiguous effects. The economic and political complexity of
low-skilled migration must not be used as an excuse for procrastina-
tion. The EU has already fallen behind in attracting high-skilled
migrants.By contrast, Australia, Canada and Switzerland are particu-
larly successful in attracting foreign graduates through “points” based
immigration systems. Europe should follow suit to position itself in the
global competition for talent. 
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Source: see Table 1
The EU should open up to skilled immi-
grants through a points system via a
“Blue Card” granting access to its entire
labour market. This European version of
the Green Card could become a powerful
complement to any national effort to
attract top talent.  In addition, students
graduating with a Masters degree or
equivalent from European universities or
from top universities abroad should be
automatically eligible for a Blue Card.
This “Blue Diploma” would help attract
young talent early. Finally, in future
rounds of EU enlargement, higher-skilled
workers should be welcome immedia-
tely, provided they reach an earnings
threshold: the “External Minimum Wage”. 
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The Governor of She asked
Confucius about government. The
Master said, “Make the local people
happy and attract migrants from
afar.”
The Analects, Confucius
ECONOMIC  historians have shown
that migration contributed more to
the convergence of income across
the globe than trade did in the 19th
century. However, in more recent
years it has been strangely neglec-
ted as a major economic force and
re-emerged only with accelerated
globalisation in the aftermath of the
disappearance of the iron curtain. 
Over the coming years, migration
rates and migration pressures might
well increase further. Globalisation is
rapidly “shrinking” the world without
shrinking worldwide income diffe-
rences quite as fast. In particular,
the near neighbourhood of Europe
has around 500m inhabitants, many
keen to migrate to Europe. There cer-
tainly are many more potential
migrants than Europe seems willing
to absorb.
The argument of this brief is that
significantly more high-skilled immi-
gration would be a boon for Europe.
The economic and political com-
plexity of the issue of low-skilled
immigration, which has much more
ambiguous effects, must not be
used as a pretext to procrastinate. 
I n s t e a d ,  E u r o p e  s h o u l d  a t t r a c t
highly-skilled migrants at a greatly
accelerated rate to position itself in
the global competition for talent. The
time has come to tell those bright
young graduates of the world:
Welcome to Europe!
In Section 1, the basic facts of migra-
tion, its skill content, and the increa-
sing supply of skills worldwide will
be examined. In Section 2 the basic
efficiency and distribution argu-
ments for and against high and low-
skilled migration are analysed. The
impact of emigration - “brawn drain”
and “brain drain” - on developing
source countries is also discussed.
Finally, Section 3 proposes potential
policy options for Europe.
ter at attracting talent from the rest of
the world. The European Commission
has accordingly become active in this
area (Box 1).
However, progress has been slow
because many relevant stakeholders
still use problematic concepts to dis-
cuss migration, most importantly the
“lump-of-labour” fallacy according to
which the number of jobs in an eco-
nomy is fixed. This policy brief argues
that the issue of economic migration
should instead be framed in terms of
the skill level of immigrants. 
The differences in both the extent and
the skill composition of migration,
among developed countries, are stri-
king. In particular, the percentage of
highly-skilled foreign-born in the
entire population varies widely, as
highlighted by Table 1, in which green
indicates a high percentage, yellow a
mid-range percentage and red a low
percentage of high-skilled foreign-
born in the population. 
Australia, Canada, and Switzerland
have been phenomenally successful
in attracting large numbers of
migrants with a strong bias towards
high-skilled immigration. All three
countries have a points-based system
for attracting high-skilled immigrants
(Box 2).
In mid-range immigration countries,
the picture is much more varied.
Germany, for example, has attracted
1. MIGRATION AND THE
GLOBAL SUPPLY OF SKILLS
Immigration rates in the EU-15 and the
US remained at relatively moderate
levels during the 1960s, 1970s, and
most of the 1980s, as shown in Chart
1. Migration rates only shot up in the
late eighties and early nineties. They
rose again substantially in the early
2000s in Europe in particular, driven
by immigration to the EU-15 from
Eastern Europe. In addition, there is
significant illegal immigration.
There are concerns in Europe over this
influx of immigrants, and low-skilled
immigrants in particular. At the same
time, to become a competitive and
dynamic knowledge-driven economy
as spelled out in the Lisbon agenda,
Europe will need to become much bet-
CHART 1
RECENT INCREASE IN IMMIGRATION TO THE EU AND THE US
0
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Source: Eurostat, US Office of Imm. Statistics, US Census Bureau. 
“Europe will need
to become much
better at attracting
talent from the rest
of the world.”
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1European
Commission (2005).
disproportionate numbers of low-skil-
led immigrants, consistent with its
historically large guest worker pro-
gramme. English-speaking countries
may have a distinct advantage in
attracting high-skilled migrants, not
least through their universities. But
contrary to popular perception, the US
does not follow this pattern. This is the
result of a large influx of low-skilled
immigrants from Mexico. 
But what if many more countries follo-
wed the examples of Canada,
Switzerland, and Australia? Would
those other countries simply be com-
peting for the same scarce internatio-
nal supply of skilled labour? Chart 2
comprehensively dispels this concern.
Over the last 15 years, the number of
students in tertiary education has
increased dramatically. 
Today, the share of students in the
population is in fact lower in the old EU
member states (EU-15) than in the new
member states (EU-10) or the wider EU
neighbourhood (EU Neighbourhood
Policy Countries + Russia). Turkey is
also catching uprapidly. 
TABLE 1
INTERNATIONAL COMPARISONS  OF THE EXTENT AND SKILL COMPOSITION OF MIGRATION
COUNTRY % FOREIGN-
BORN
% WITH TERTIARY EDUCATION AMONG: HIGH-SKILLED
FOREIGN-BORN 
(% TOTAL POP.)
POINTS SYSTEM TO
ATTRACT HIGH-
SKILLED AS OF: NATIVES FOREIGN-BORN
POLAND 2.1 10.4 11.9 0.2 N/A
SPAIN 5.3 19.4 21.8 1.2 N/A
PORTUGAL 6.3 7.7 19.3 1.2 N/A
DENMARK 6.8 18.8 19.5 1.3 N/A
UK 8.3 20.1 34.8 2.9 2007
*
FRANCE 10.0 16.9 18.1 1.8 N/A
NETHERLANDS 10.1 19.5 17.6 1.8 N/A
BELGIUM 10.7 22.9 21.6 2.3 N/A
SWEDEN 12.0 22.8 24.2 2.9 N/A
US 12.3 26.9 25.9 3.2 N/A
GERMANY 12.5 19.5 15.5 1.9 N/A
CANADA 19.3 31.5 38.0 7.3 1967
SWITZERLAND 22.4 18.1 23.7 5.3 1996
AUSTRALIA 23.0 38.6 42.9 9.9 1984
Source: Dumont and Lemaître (2004)
*Expected date following announcement by
UKHome Office in March 2006
BOX 1: EU-Level Activity on Economic Migration
A recent Policy Plan on Legal Migration
1 outlines the initiatives the European
Commission intends to take over the 2006-09 period. This plan is based on the
Green Paper, “On an EU Approach to Managing Economic Migration”, of January
2005, and the wide consultation that followed. 
In particular, a framework directive is planned in order to define a common set of
basic rights granted to migrant workers. Furthermore, four specific directives
would be designed to discipline the entry and residence of particular types of
immigrants, namely highly-skilled and seasonal workers, intra-corporate transfer-
ees and remunerated trainees. 
One of the main objectives is to make the EU more attractive to high-skilled
migrants. Whether this could be achieved through an EU work permit, similar to the
Blue Card proposed in the brief, is under discussion.
BOX 2: The Canadian Example of a Points-Based Immigration System
The points system for immigration was pioneered by Canada in 1967 and
its skills bias was reinforced in 2001. Under the current rules, a foreign
applicant must have previous work experience as a skilled worker to be eli-
gible for treatment under the points system. Then, to be able to become
established in Canada, a minimum of 67 points out of 96 have to be award-
ed on the basis of the following factors:
•Education (up to 25 pts)
•Proficiency in the official languages (up to 20 pts)
•Experience (up to 21 pts)
•Age with more points for younger migrants (up to 10 pts)
•Arranged employment (up to 10 pts)
•Adaptability including family ties to Canada (up to 10 pts)
These factors aim at capturing not only the economic potential but also the
likelihood of a successful integration.b
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2China, India,
Indonesia, Brazil,
Pakistan,
Bangladesh, Nigeria,
Mexico, Vietnam,
Philippines.
3Strictly speaking,
agglomeration effects
need not improve ove-
rall efficiency.  (See
Charlot et al, 2006) 
WELCOME TO EUROPE
In summary, important factors driving
migration today include good institu-
tions and agglomeration effects. In
both areas, Europe is well positioned. 
In view of these important efficiency
arguments
3 for migration, why is free
migration such a remote prospect?
Besides non-economic factors, distri-
butional concerns are the main rea-
son.
The basic argument is easily under-
stood: Almost by definition, the
migrant himself or herself derives
benefits from a higher wage abroad. In
the host country, wages of workers
with labour market characteristics
similar to those of the migrant can be
expected to marginally decline while
the income of those with different
skills increases. Beneficiaries typical-
ly include people with different skills
and owners of capital and land. In the
opment problem by allowing workers
move to locations with a better “pro-
duction function” immediately. 
Second, agglomeration effects are an
important rationale for migration. For
example, France and the UK are large
countries with fairly uniform institu-
tions, free trade and free movement of
capital. Nevertheless, workers continue
to migrate to extremely expensive and
crowded places like London or Paris. The
reason is, people become more produc-
tive by virtue of geographic concentra-
tion. By moving to a large agglomera-
tion, often in a foreign country, they can
also hope to greatly improve the match
between their skill and their job, thus
boosting their productivity.
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CHART 2
NUMBER OF STUDENTS IN TERTIARY EDUCATION
Source: Edstats (World Bank)
Nearest available year used when student
data missing for 1990 or 2004.
*Bosnia & Herzogovina, Armenia, Palestinian
Authority, and Syria not included in EU &
Proximity due to missing data.
COUNTRY (POP.)
2. EFFICIENCY REASONS FOR
MIGRATION:  A PRIMER
Economic migration can loosely be
defined as any cross-border migra-
tion that occurs to take on a better
paid job. If pay is broadly in line with
productivity, a move to a better paid
job thus increases global economic
output. This is the fundamental effi-
ciency argument in favour of migra-
tion.
But most people would prefer to stay
at home if it wasn’t for the money.
Therefore, why not upgrade productiv-
ity where the people currently are
instead of having people chase more
productive jobs abroad? International
trade and cross-border movement of
capital are helping to do just that.
According to the classic factor price
equalisation theorem of trade theory,
wages might in principle be equalised
internationally through the trade of
goods alone! However, there are
important reasons why migration
pressures are likely to persist even
under free trade, full mobility of capi-
tal, and flexible labour markets
domestically.
First, many poor countries suffer
from an inferior “production function”
because of poor institutions. Despite
recent development success stories,
upgrading poor institutions is a slow
process. In the meantime, workers in
many developing countries will con-
tinue to suffer from inferior wages.
Migration can short-circuit this devel-
Even more striking is the increasing
supply of skill among the Pop-10
2, the
10 most populous economies outside
the US and Europe. Over the last 15
years, the Pop-10 have collectively
increased their numbers of students
by 156%. As a result, they now have
more students than the enlarged EU
and the US combined.
Overall, tertiary education rates have
been converging much faster than
incomes. As a result, no shortage of
young and high-skilled migrants is to
be expected any time soon. If Europe
wants to welcome more high-skilled
migrants, it can.
21m 
9,7m 
1m 
0.4m 
1m 
0.7m 
9.3m 
5.1m 
16.3m 
3.8m 
5m 
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4However, if the low-
skilled unemploy-
ment is due to cen-
tralised wage setting
coupled with low
mobility, additional
low-skilled immigra-
tion might actually
reduce unemploy-
ment by reducing the
marginal producti-
vity differentials bet-
ween regions, as
explained in Boeri
and Brücker (2005). 
concerns that come with low-skilled
migration, at this stage.
Assuming a welfare function that is
inequality averse, the efficiency and
distributional findings can now be
brought together. High-skilled immi-
gration is likely to increase welfare
among the host country population
since both efficiency and equity are
likely to be improved.  By contrast,
low-skilled immigration has an
ambiguous welfare effect in the host
country. It increases efficiency from
the perspective of the native popula-
tion provided that there is sufficient
adjustment in the capital stock while
widening the income gap between
rich and poor in the host country. 
The welfare argument in favour of
high-skilled immigration and the wel-
fare ambiguity of low-skilled immigra-
tion are reinforced by a number of
additional aspects that have so far
been neglected:
(i) The Fiscal Impact of Migration in a
Welfare State. 
Obviously, the net fiscal
impact of a high-skilled
immigrant tends to be sub-
stantially more favourable
than the net fiscal impact of
a low-skilled migrant.
However, even low-skilled
immigrants can make a pos-
itive net contribution to the
welfare state since pay-as-
you-go pensions impose a large bur-
den on young migrants. 
(ii) Migration and Inflexible Labour
Markets.
Low-skilled workers are typically more
affected by poorly functioning labour
markets than high-skilled workers.
Chart 3 shows that the unemployment
rate of low-skilled workers in Europe is
systematically higher than for high-
skilled workers. On average, the former
stands at 10% in the EU while the latter
is only 5% and can primarily be
explained by frictional unemployment.
This suggests that the labour market
will be able to absorb high-skilled
migrants morereadily than low-skilled
migrants.
4
source country, the wage impact will
be a mirror image: the wage prospects
of workers similar to the emigrant are
set to improve while those with com-
plementary factors of production
would tend to suffer
somewhat. 
On that basis, low-skilled
immigrants will tend to
increase income inequali-
ty among the native pop-
ulation in the host coun-
try as the already below-
average wages of low-
skilled natives will come
under additional pres-
sure. By analogous argu-
ments, high-skilled-
migration has a benign
distributional impact in
the host country and an
adverse distributional
impact in the source country.
Ultimately, these opposing effects
between different skill groups and dif-
ferent countries are likely to be at the
core of any economic controversy
over migration. 
However, while this theoretical argu-
ment is simple and compelling, it has
been surprisingly difficult to find con-
vincing empirical evidence to support
it. In their analysis of empirical sur-
veys, Longhi et al. (2005, 2006) find
only a minute “consensus estimate”
of the distributional impact: a one per
cent increase in immigration only
leads to a 0.12% decline in wages
within the relevant skill segment and
a 0.024% decline in employment. 
If this were true, it would be wonderful
news. Essentially, one could stop wor-
rying about the distributional implica-
tions of migration altogether.
However, as Borjas (2003) has point-
ed out, most of the empirical studies
that fail to find a significant distribu-
tional impact of migration focus on
the impact of immigration on wages
in small geographic areas. But such
an approach fails to control for the
endogeneity of migration. Migrants
tend to be attracted to locations that
have the most vibrant local
economies and therefore typically the
most attractive wages. Hence, any
negative wage impact of immigration
might be hidden by above-average
wages in areas that manage to attract
the largest numbers of migrants. 
By applying an econo-
metric approach
immune to this partic-
ular concern, Borjas
(2003) and Aydemir
and Borjas (2006)
obtain substantially
higher estimates of
the wage impact of
migration for the US,
Canada, and Mexico.
According to these
studies, immigration
of 1% reduces wages
at the respective skill-
level by between 0.3
and 0.4% and migra-
tion could explain up
to one third of the increase in the
wage gap between low-skilled and
high-skilled wages in the US over
recent decades. Furthermore, Borjas
finds in a simulation that any efficien-
cy gains may
well be tiny com-
pared to these
adverse distribu-
tion effects.  
But those find-
ings are unlikely
to mark the end
of the empirical
debate. Bonin
(2005) applies
Borjas’ methodology to German data
and finds much smaller effects. Also,
questions remain as to why the wage
effects of classic natural experiments
like the Miami Boatlift and the mass
emigration from the Commonwealth
of Independent States (CIS) countries
have not been more marked. Finally,
Ottaviano and Peri (2006) find signif-
icant complementarity of native and
foreign workers within the same skill
group and they argue that only the
least skilled group of natives in the US
are likely to experience a negative
wage impact due to migration. 
But one thing is clear: the empirical lit-
erature has not been able to compre-
hensively dispel the distributional
“The net fiscal
impact of a high-
skilled immigrant
tends to be more
favourable .”
“High-skilled
immigration is
likely to increase
welfare in the
host country
since both effi-
ciency and
equity are likely
to be improved.”WELCOME TO EUROPE
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The source country may suffer from
an adverse efficiency and distribu-
tional impact as a result of the brain
drain. There will be fiscal loss since
high-skilled emigrants will no longer
pay taxes in their home country. And
just as high-skilled migrants help to
uplift their ethnic communities
abroad, they could have made notable
contributions to public life had they
stayed at home.
But a brain drain is not all bad for the
source country. The option to emi-
grate may substantially increase the
expected returns to education, there-
by improving education incentive.
Finally, if migrants return to their
country of origin, and many of them
do, the skills and savings they have
acquired abroad become a powerful
force of development. Therefore, mod-
erate levels of brain drain may actual-
ly be beneficial for the source country
as, for example, argued in Beine et al.
(2003).
The findings of the previous sections
are summarised in Figure 1: High-
skilled migration tends to improve the
welfare of the host country while the
welfare impact of migration on the
source country is ambiguous. By con-
trast, low-skilled migration has an
ambiguous welfare impact on the host
country while generally improving wel-
fare of the source country. Hence,
there need not be a conflict of interest
between source and host country but
there may well be. This raises the ques-
tion how could the positions of host
and source country be reconciled, if
indeed there were a conflict? 
CHART 3
UNEMPLOYMENT IN EUROPE BY SKILL-LEVEL*
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FIGURE 1
THEORETICAL MIGRATION
PREFERENCES
HIGH-
SKILLED
MIGRA-
TION
LOW-
SKILLED
MIGRA-
TION
POOR SOURCE
COUNTRY
RICH HOST
COUNTRY 
+
+
?
?
LOW-SKILLED UNEMPLOYMENT (%)
H
I
G
H
-
S
K
I
L
L
E
D
 
U
N
E
M
P
L
O
Y
M
E
N
T
 
(
%
)
(iii) Dangers of an Ethnic Underclass
There are signs that certain immi-
grant communities in Europe are
developing into an ethnic underclass.
It is clear that much better education
and improved economic opportuni-
ties for the children of low-skilled
migrants already in Europe, need to
be provided. Migration policies can
usefully complement such integration
measures by creating a high-skill bias
among fresh immigrants. Low-skilled
immigrants already in Europe are the
closest labour market substitutes to
new low-skill immigrants. Hence, by
reducing the inflow of additional low-
skilled immigrants, the economic
prospects of existing low-skilled
immigrant communities could proba-
bly be improved.  
For the source country, low-skilled emi-
gration or “brawn drain” typically
improves welfare as it improves both
efficiency and redistribution. This posi-
tive impact of low-skilled emigration is
reinforced by remittances. Low-skilled
emigrants will often help to support
poor relatives in the source country
with their higher earnings abroad. 
By contrast, the welfare impact of
high-skilled emigration or “brain
drain” is ambiguous.
Unlike trade, migration will generally
require international compensating
transfers instead of purely national
ones if efficiency gains are in part to
be used to compensate the losers. In
particular, it will typically be neces-
sary for a rich host country to share
some of the gains from high-skilled
migration, including the gains from
the immigrants, with the poor source
country. Perhaps the most prominent
proposal in this respect is the
Bhagwati tax, a special income tax on
the high-skilled immigrant the pro-
ceeds of which are to be transferred
back to the source country in com-
pensation for the migratory move. 
This tax may be difficult to implement
in practice because of international
cooperation, and some forms of tax
discrimination based on the place of
birth may not be constitutional under
all circumstances, but Europe could
certainly go a long way towards gain-
ing the moral high ground simply by
fulfilling last year’s commitments toWELCOME TO EUROPE
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3. POLICY PROPOSALS 
If the potential distributional pro-
blems with the source countries can
be fairly resolved, how should Europe
go about attracting high-skilled
migrants? Before answering this
question, the term “high-skilled”
migrant needs a better practical defi-
nition.
Perhaps the most obvious definition
of skill would be based on formal
qualifications. This also makes some
economic sense since formal qualifi-
cations tend to be a fairly good pre-
dictor of future ear-
nings potential.
This is relevant
since most
migrants move in
their 20s or early
30s when their cur-
rent earnings are
only a relatively
poor predictor of
future earnings
potential. 
However, from an eco-
nomic perspective, a
definition of skill
ought to go beyond formal qualifications.
As long as an immigrant is likely to
achieve high earnings in the host coun-
try, he could be argued to have suffi-
ciently rare talent so as to be regarded as
highly skilled. This is the salary-based
definition of skill. It is a highly flexible
definition, capturing all kinds of profes-
sional excellence, including sports such
as football and creative professions,
which are difficult to standardise. 
(i) An EU-wide Blue Card for high-
skilled migrants.
In a points system of immigration,
both definitions of skill can simply
be used in parallel. In view of the
high flexibility of points systems and
their success in attracting high-skil-
led migrants, it seems likely that
many European countries will adopt
them over the coming years. 
This raises the question whether
there is any room for European invol-
vement regarding high-skilled migra-
tion. High-skilled migrants could give
rise to positive cross-border externa-
lities within the EU similar to
research and development. In princi-
ple, this argument might even be
used to justify subsidies for attrac-
ting high-skilled migrants, perhaps
in the form of a centrally financed
Erasmus style programme to attract
third country nationals. 
However, before going down the
route of explicit subsidies, the
attractiveness of Europe could be
increased for free by providing third
country nationals immediate access
to the entire EU
labour market. This
will be more valuable
from the perspective
of the migrant than
access to any natio-
nal labour market
due to the option
value of the additio-
nal markets. Also,
such an EU wide
immigration regime
would provide much
greater visibility,
predictability, and
transparency than
25 different national systems
Therefore, it is recommended to
introduce a “Blue Card”, a European
Green Card that would provide highly
skilled third country nationals with
instant access to the entire
European labour market. This Blue
Card would be allocated on the basis
of skill through a Europe wide points
system. Overall, such a system
should make it significantly easier
for Europe to compete for top talent
with countries like the US or Canada. 
By contrast, the positive spill-over of
low-skilled immigration is likely to be
limited. Therefore, low-skilled migra-
tion could remain the responsibility
of the member states for the time
being, unless significant negative
spill-over effects are discovered in
specific areas that would need to be
addressed collectively.
(ii) Blue Diplomas for Foreign Graduates
As one particular variant of the Blue
Card, an entirely qualification-based
“Blue Diploma” could be introduced.
Any graduate of a Masters programme
(or equivalent) from a participating
university could be made eligible for a
Blue card by virtue of his or her
degree. Such a comprehensive and
predictable arrangement would
greatly help to attract foreign talent to
European universities and to the
European labour market afterwards.
In principle, it would make sense to
extend Blue Diplomas  to universities
outside Europe also. For a start, the
top 100  non-European universities,
as measured by academic excellence,
should also be included in the
scheme. 
Even from a development perspec-
tive, the Blue Diploma could turn out
to be beneficial. By providing guaran-
teed access to the European labour
market without requiring a perma-
nent presence, circular migration in
the spirit of the proposal by Weil
(2006) would be encouraged. The
Blue Card would in effect act as an
insurance policy for graduates from
developing countries in case they
would like to take the risk of going
back home. They could always return
to Europe for a second chance. 
(iii) An External Minimum Wage
It turns out that the skills-based
approach of migration also has an
interesting application to EU enlarge-
ment. For new rounds of EU enlarge-
ment (Bulgaria, Rumania, eventually
Turkey), the question arises of how
to manage the transition to full
labour mobility. 
“The Blue Card would
act as an insurance
policy for graduates
from developing 
countries.”
significantly increase development
aid as a percentage of GDP. More
specifically, the EU could make a
point of subsidising education sys-
tems as an increasing function of the
net inflow from any particular source
country. Alternatively, rich countries
could allocate more work permits for
low-skilled workers, since a mixed
strategy between high-skilled and low-
skilled migration could also overcome
the potential conflict of interest depict-
ed in Figure 1. Additional possibilities
are discussed in the next section.As with immigration from third coun-
tries, the old member states will typi-
cally be more readily persuaded to
open up their labour markets for high-
skilled than for low-skilled workers
from new member states.
Furthermore, due to the strictly limi-
ted duration of the transition process
to full labour mobility, the dangers of
abuse are less pronounced than they
would otherwise be. Hence, a simple
salary-based approach can be used to
introduce full mobility for high-skilled
workers while delaying access for low-
skilled workers.
Citizens of new EU member states
would be allowed to enter work
contracts that pay above an external
minimum wage in all old member
states. This wage floor could initially
be set at the median wage in each
old member state. With time, the
external minimum wage could be
lowered at a jointly agreed minimum
pace to reach full free mobility. Of
course, any old member state would
be allowed to open its labour market
faster, or even lift all restrictions
immediately, if it chose to do so.
Germany and other countries who
have not yet introduced full mobility
from the 2002 round of enlargement
would be well advised to apply this
approach immediately to attract
high-skilled workers from the pre-
sent new member states in Eastern
Europe. Germany could introduce an
external minimum wage of €30,000
per year for citizens of the new mem-
ber states in Eastern Europe. For
young workers, this threshold could
even be set somewhat lower, at
€24,000. As a result, the low wage
sector in Germany would continue to
be protected for the time being while
Germany could start enjoying the
benefits of skilled migration imme-
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diately. Over the next 3 to 5 years,
this external minimum wage could
then be progressively lowered in
order to assure a smooth transition
to full worker mobility in 2009 or
2011. 
***
While Europe would clearly benefit
by attracting more talent from
abroad, continued low-skilled migra-
tion will not necessarily be harmful.
In this brief, it has merely been
argued that the complex issue of low-
skilled migration should not hold us
back in finding a better approach to
skilled migration.
By the same token, the introduction
of better integration policies is a no-
brainer that must not be delayed by
the continuing complex discussion
of how restrictive or liberal migration
policies for low-skilled migrants
should be.
The author acknowledges the valua-
ble research assistance of Fulvio
Mulatero in the prepartion of this
policy brief. 
“The complex issue of
low-skilled migration
should not hold us
back in finding a 
better approach to 
skilled migration.”